July 23, 2006

Dear Sir:

I am having another sleepless night here in your apartment.

Does government rent regulation law so forcibly affect your speculation plans that you must make a “free market” offer to your unregulated tenant that is that much more financially debilitating?

You are forcing me to buy or leave my home of 17 years without regard to what I can afford because it is what the letter of the law allows.

You are acting within the letter of the law even though my apartment is part of the 86% of shares in a “non-eviction” cooperative residence plan that have remained unsold for 17 years while the real estate market rose precipitously, and while the tenant therein, me was ever told he could only rent, never buy.

You, as incorporator of an LLC formed to be the third “purchaser” of UNSOLD shares, pay a monthly maintenance of $872, to yourself as managing agent, while I pay $1,625 to you.

Although in your final offer you allege to have “shot your wad,” and “tapped yourself dry,” please note that in order to fulfill upon your offer, I must do the following:

Because I can only pay $75,000 of your purchase price, I ask a bank willing to underwrite mortgages in a less-than-51% owner/occupied building to lend me the rest.

After closing, my monthly payment will be $872 to you and $3,128 to the bank.

Rather than paying $1,625 a month, nearly double your maintenance cost, I will pay, at a minimum, $4,200 a month, for the next 30 years.

If that is your idea of free market negotiations with people and their homes, then re-exam the GBL Article 23-A language, which you swore the attorney general you would uphold. This is the same language you say housing judges in Manhattan will ignore based on an appellate term decision involving a tenant who took possession of an apartment 5 years after it went "Condo."

First let's look at a dictionary.
The holder of UNSOLD shares in cooperative corporation is NOT a PURCHASER:
"Sold" means "to be purchased."

You swore to the attorney general to comply with this language.

GENERAL BUSINESS LAW
ARTICLE 23-A. FRAUDULENT PRACTICES IN RESPECT TO STOCKS, BONDS AND OTHER SECURITIES

NY CLS Gen Bus § 352-eeee (2006)

§ 352-eeee. [Expires June 15, 2011] Conversions to cooperative or condominium ownership in the city of New York

1. (e) "Non-purchasing tenant". A person who has not purchased under the plan and who is a tenant entitled to possession at the time the plan is declared effective or a person to whom a dwelling unit is rented subsequent to the effective date. A person who sublets a dwelling unit from a purchaser under the plan shall not be deemed a non-purchasing tenant.

2. (ii) No eviction proceedings will be commenced at any time against non-purchasing tenants for failure to purchase or any other reason applicable to expiration of tenancy; ...
(iv) The rentals of non-purchasing tenants who reside in dwelling units not subject to government regulation as to rentals and continued occupancy and non-purchasing tenants who reside in dwelling units with respect to which government regulation as to rentals and continued occupancy is eliminated or becomes inapplicable after the plan has been accepted for filing by the attorney general shall not be subject to unconscionable increases beyond ordinary rentals for comparable apartments during the period of their occupancy. In determining comparability, consideration shall be given to such factors as building services, level of maintenance and operating expenses.

187 Misc. 2d 243; 721 N.Y.S.2d 459;
2000 N.Y. Misc. 573,
Park West Village Associates, Respondent, v. Chiyoko Nishoika, Appellant, et al., Respondents.
# 99-562
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
187 Misc. 2d 243; 721 N.Y.S.2d 459; 2000 N.Y. Misc. 573
October 26, 2000, Decided
LEXIS OVERVIEW: Appellant entered into possession of the apartment at issue under a lease agreement five years after the residential building premises underwent a non-eviction type conversion to condominium ownership. The lease agreement expired, and respondent landlord brought a holdover action. The appellate court held that, in light of the legislative purpose underlying § 352-eeee, appellant's post-conversion leasehold did not fall within the statute's reach.